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ll usIt is well known that unless worker-ﬁrmmatch quality is controlled
for, reduced-form estimates of returns to ﬁrm tenure will be biased.
In this paper, we show that there is a further pervasive source of bias,
namely, the comovement of ﬁrm employment and ﬁrm wages. We
argue that ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects must be used to eliminate this bias.
Estimates from two large-panel data sets from Germany and Portu-
gal show that the bias is empirically important. Finally, we show that
the results extend to tenure correlates used inmacroeconomics, such
as the minimum unemployment rate since joining the ﬁrm.I. Introduction and Overview
There is a large empirical literature that attempts to identify and consis-
tently estimate returns to ﬁrm tenure (RTT). The aim of this literature ishis work was partly supported by the Economic and Social Research Council
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Ato obtain the pure causal effect of tenure on wages (Altonji and Shakotko
1987)—that is, the effect on the wage of one more year of tenure, holding
constant years of experience and job-match quality broadly interpreted. In
turn, this causal effect is implicitly or explicitly viewed as being a measure of
the returns to ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital and/or to contractual mechanisms
that reward tenure for incentive reasons. The traditional approach is to use
coefﬁcient estimates of wages on deterministic tenure in a Mincer regression
to obtain ameasure of RTT. This reduced-formmethod is easy to implement
and avoids having to make structural economic assumptions about worker
entry and exit from the ﬁrm.
However, the existence of unobservable wage shocks that drive ﬁrm hir-
ing and worker exit may complicate the interpretation of reduced-form es-
timates; their existence will make tenure endogenous. Put another way, in
the presence of such shocks, reduced-form estimates cannot be interpreted
as the causal effect of tenure onwages.Much of the literature has focused on
worker-ﬁrm match quality as the key unobservable confounding factor for
RTT. In particular, if we believe that better matches tend to last longer, ten-
ure will be endogenous and failing to control for match quality will induce
upward bias in reduced-formRTT estimates. Three canonical methods have
been used to circumvent this problem: (i) the two-step estimator of Topel
(1991), (ii) the instrumental variable (IV) approach of Altonji and Shakotko
(1987), and (iii) themethod of controlling for completed tenure of Abraham
and Farber (1987). More recently, the emergence of very-large-panel data
sets that record complete work histories of workers has allowed investiga-
tors to absorb unobservedmatch quality by addingﬁrm-workermatchﬁxed
effects (see, e.g., Battisti 2012). The downside of doing this is that—as in
Topel’s (1991) method—the estimated tenure effect will include the effect
of linear experience, and this must be backed out using an auxiliary regres-
sion. The upside, however, is that it automatically controls for the impact
of time-invariant worker and ﬁrm heterogeneity; employing ﬁxed effects
for this purpose avoids the concern that RTT estimates may be sensitive
to the investigator’s selection of controls. A speciﬁcation that controls for
match quality using worker-ﬁrm interaction (match) ﬁxed effects provides
us with our fourth traditional method for eliminating the upward bias in
RTT due to unobserved match quality.
In this paper, we identify a further and potentially equally pervasive
source of bias to RTT: the existence of a time-varying wage component that
is common to all of a ﬁrm’s workers but that comoves with its employment.
We argue that even in aworldwherematch quality is irrelevant, the failure to
account for these wage components will bias estimates of returns to tenure,responding author, Andy Snell, at a.j.snell@ed.ac.uk. Information concerning ac-
cess to the data used in this paper is available as supplemental material online.
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Amost likely in a downward direction. The mechanism generating the bias
is simple: suppose ﬁrms that have a relatively high wage at time t also have
high employment, high hiring, and low average ﬁrm tenure at t or that ﬁrms
that have a relatively lowwage at t also have low employment, lowhiring, and
high average ﬁrm tenure at t.1 This induces negative feedback from equal-
treatmentwage shocks to tenure. In this paper, we show that traditional esti-
mators—ones designed to eliminate the effects of unobservable worker-ﬁrm
match quality—are not immune to potentially sizable biases arising from this
effect.
Drivers of aﬁrm’s wage/employment comovementsmay include both ag-
gregate (business cycle) shocks and ﬁrm-speciﬁc shocks. In both cases, the
shocks that are the root cause of the problemare assumed to impact allwork-
ers in theﬁrm.We call these common components ofwages equal-treatment
shocks following the relevant macro literature (see, e.g., Gertler and Trigari
2009; Snell and Thomas 2010; Moscarini and Postel-Vinay 2013 for macro
models subject to within-ﬁrm equal treatment). Because equal-treatment
shocks are the same for eachworker in aﬁrm in a particular year,we propose
that they be controlled for via the addition of ﬁrm-year interaction ﬁxed ef-
fects to panel wage regressions while at the same time also controlling for
the more traditional match-quality problem.2
In an empirical application,weuse two large samples drawn frommatched-
panel data sets fromGermany and Portugal to show that the four traditional
methods produce RTT estimates that are substantially lower than that ob-
tained using our proposed correction. If we take the average RTT estimate
from the four traditional methods as a benchmark, then adding ﬁrm-year
ﬁxed effects to wage equations (while controlling for worker-ﬁrm match
quality) increases estimated RTT in Germany by about 2.5% of wages and
in Portugal by about 3.5% of wages at 10 years of tenure. This amounts to
about 20% and 40%, respectively, of the bias-corrected RTT level itself. Al-
though investigators may have been aware of this problem (see, e.g., a dis-
cussion on high wage/employment growth ﬁrms in Topel 1991), to the best
of our knowledge, we are the ﬁrst to quantify its importance and propose a
(simple) solution.
One interesting supplementary result from our estimation method is that
the ﬁtted ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects appear to follow a unit root; like unob-
served match quality, the equal-treatment shocks also appear to have a per-
manent impact on a worker’s wages within a ﬁrm.Given that entry into and
exit out of aﬁrm are likely driven by permanent (rather than transient) wage1 There is also a steady-state cross-sectional effect: high-paying ﬁrms tend to have
low labor turnover and hence longer tenure. However, this type of time-invariant
cross-sectional effect is usually removed via the addition of ﬁrm ﬁxed effects.
2 Aggregate business cycle shocks can be controlled for by including time-ﬁxed
effects; in fact, we ﬁnd that shocks below the aggregate level account for almost all
of the bias.
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Ashocks, this is consistent with our ﬁnding that equal-treatment shocks cause
bias in RTT estimates. It suggests that if one wishes to obtain the causal ef-
fects of tenure on wages, one must control for all permanent wage shocks
whether they arise from equal-treatment shocks or from match quality.
A further implication of our results is that using regressors that interact
macroeconomic variables, such as unemployment, with deterministic ten-
ure will also result in biased inference. Canonical examples of such variables
are Beaudry and DiNardo’s (1991) minimum unemployment rate during a
worker’s tenure (minu) and a new-hire dummy interacted with unemploy-
ment to measure the incremental cyclicality of new-hire wages. The empir-
ical importance of these variates found in the literature adds a further twist
because their omission from Mincer equations will be yet another source
of bias to RTT estimates. Another way of saying this is that if wage growth
within the ﬁrm contains both the effects of human capital and implicit con-
tracts, then to consistently estimate these separate effects requires inclusion
of the relevant contract variate (e.g., minu) and ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects. We
examine some of these issues in Section III below.3
The key result in this paper, that there is yet another source of pervasive
bias to RTT estimates obtained via reduced-form estimation, may lead the
investigator to conclude that a safer way to proceed is via a fully speciﬁed
structural model of wage shocks and worker mobility (for a recent example
of such a model, see Buchinsky et al. 2010). However, one key ﬁnding of
our work is that it is ﬁrm-speciﬁc (heterogeneous) comovement that drives
the biases weﬁnd and notmacro (aggregate) effects. A structural model with
heterogeneous ﬁrm hiring (and ﬁring)—as opposed to cyclically related hir-
ing—maybehard to specify and identify empirically.Additionally, estimates
gleaned from structural models may be only as good as the veracity of their
underlying assumptions. As far as reduced-form modeling goes, our paper
has a clear message: to avoid substantial RTT bias, one must control for not
only worker-ﬁrmmatch quality but also equal-treatment shocks.
The paper is laid out as follows. Section II revisits the traditional econo-
metric model of RTT and the implications for wages. We outline the four
traditional estimation methods of Abraham and Farber (1987), Altonji and
Shakotko (1987), Topel (1991), and the addition of match ﬁxed effects. We
estimate RTT for these methods using Portuguese and German panel data
and plot the corresponding RTT proﬁles together with that obtained using
our proposed correction. We then offer an anatomy of the bias from a theo-
retical and empirical viewpoint. Importantly, here we show that the bias is
driven by heterogeneous (across ﬁrms) employment/wage comovements.
Section III looks at the implications of our analysis when contractual vari-3 There may, of course, be other sources of wage growth within the ﬁrm arising
from wage contracts, such as back-loading, for which observable controls are not
available. We discuss these issues in Sec. III below.
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Aables play a role, in particular, tenure-relatedmacro variables associatedwith
wage contracts. Section IV offers concluding comments.
II. Estimates of RTT: A Comparison of Traditional
Methods and the Corrected Method
In this section, we estimate RTT using the four traditional methods out-
lined above and compare the implied RTT proﬁles obtained with that ob-
tained using our proposed correction for ﬁrm employment/wage comove-
ments. To begin, we revisit the bias caused by unobserved match quality
and outline themethods thatwere designed to deal with it.We call these four
methods T (Topel), AS (Altonji and Shakotko), AF (Abraham and Farber),
and MFE (match ﬁxed effects). To outline these methods, we use a some-
what simpliﬁed archetypal model of RTT. We assume that log wages wijt
for worker i in ﬁrm j at time t are given by
wijt 5 a 1 btijt 1 gEit 1 εijt, (1)
with
εijt 5 vij 1 -jt 1 uijt, (2)
where tijt is the worker’s tenure and Eit is her lifetime work experience. The
error consists of job-match quality vij (which also may include a worker
and ﬁrm ﬁxed effect), an idiosyncratic error uijt that is assumed to be uncor-
related with the regressors (especially tenure), and an equal-treatment wage
component vjt—the innovation in our study. The coefﬁcient b is the per-
year RTT within the ﬁrm.4 The traditional problem (dealt with in T, AS,
etc.) arises when the job-match quality vij is correlated with the tenure of
worker i. When the match is good (high vij), the worker’s separation hazard
may fall (see in particular Bowlus 1995) and expected tenure will rise. This
makes tenure endogenous and biases b upward. The aspiration of the tra-
ditional RTT estimation methods is to estimate the causal effect of tenure
on wages in the presence of unobserved match quality vij. The point of this
paper is to show that the existence of equal-treatment wage elements (vjt),
in addition to match quality, undermines this aspiration.
Topel’s (1991) method is to ﬁrst-difference incumbents’wages to remove
the (presumed time-invariant) match quality. In the absence of vjt, regress-
ing these incumbent wage changes on an intercept would, in this model
at least, produce a consistent estimate of b 1 g, db 1 g say. To separately
identify b and g, Topel (1991) proposed estimating a second-stage regres-
sion of wijt 2 ð db 1 gÞtijt on the worker’s initial experience on entry to the4 In more general contexts where RTT is heterogeneous across workers and/or
ﬁrms, b could be interpreted as the average RTT, or average treatment effect in
the words of the experimental literature.
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Aﬁrm. Provided the latter is not correlated with job-match quality, an ad-
mittedly strong assumption,5 this produces a consistent estimate of g. Sub-
tracting the latter estimate from db 1 g gives a consistent estimate of b.
Altonji and Shakotko (1987) proposed an IV method whereby tenure is in-
strumentedbythedeviationof tenurefromitsspellmeanftijt.Byconstruction,
this variable is orthogonal to (constant within spell) match quality. Again,
in the absence of vjt, this would offer consistent estimates of b.6 Abraham
and Farber (1987) propose adding duration—the ﬁnal ex post tenure of the
worker at the ﬁrm—as a regressor. If workers with better matches have lon-
ger completed tenure—as the traditional bias story goes—then controlling
for completed tenure directly should eliminate the bias in b.7 Finally, the
MFEmethod addsmatchﬁxed effects to the estimationprocess. This focuses
on within-match variation in tenure. As was the case with Topel, within-
match de-meaned tenure and de-meaned within-match experience are the
same variable, and the latter must be dropped from the estimation. The re-
sult is that the coefﬁcient on tenure becomes an estimate of b 1 g. To esti-
mate g—and hence b—one would use Topel’s second stage (above).
All of these methods ignore the existence of the equal-treatment wage
components vjt. If these components positively comove with ﬁrm employ-
ment, then they will be negatively correlated with ﬁrm average tenure, and
thiswill induce downward bias in estimates of b.We propose to augment the
MFE estimator with ﬁrm-year interaction ﬁxed effects (FYFE). The FYFE
will absorb the equal-treatment wage components and eliminate the bias
arising from wage/employment comovements. As with MFE and Topel,
we use a second-stage regression of wijt 2 ð db 1 gÞtijt on the worker’s expe-
rience at entry to the ﬁrm to obtain an estimate of g. If it is true that more
experienced workers do ﬁnd better matches (and this effect does have sig-
niﬁcant traction), then the estimated g will be upward biased and RTT will5 Topel (1991) argued that more experienced workers are likely to form better
matches, in line with job-shopping models of search. If true, returns to experience
will be overestimated in the second stage and tenure underestimated—his RTT es-
timates are a lower bound. He considers in detail two further sources of bias: ﬁrst,
frequent job changers may be less productive, in which case more able workers’ ini-
tial experience will tend to be lower, leading to g being underestimated. Second,
jobs offering low wage growth may survive with a lower probability than higher
wage growth jobs. This could lead to an overestimate of b 1 g. Topel (1991) gives
evidence to suggest that these biases are not likely to be signiﬁcant; we discuss the
issue further in Sec. V.
6 As with Topel (1991), this requires that experience is not correlated with job-
match quality. If it is positively correlated, again presumably because of job shop-
ping, then the estimate of g will be biased upward and that of b downward biased,
although they argue that this effect is relatively small (see Altonji and Shakotko
1987, 450–3).
7 This is under their assumption that initial experience is correlated with match
quality only through total job duration.
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Abe downward biased. At worst, therefore, the RTT proﬁle produced by
FYFE will be a lower bound for the true RTT.8
A. Data
We draw our data from the German Beschäftigten-Historik (BeH) and
the Portuguese Quadros de Pessoal (QP). Before discussing our subsam-
ples, we give a brief overview of these two well-known data sources. We
then describe the samples and the cleaning operations we perform on them.
The BeH data set is organized by worker spells. A spell is a portion of a
year spent at a single ﬁrm. For the BeH, if a worker stays with one ﬁrm
throughout the year, the average daily wage for that spell forms a single data
point. If the worker moves to a second ﬁrm within the year, there will be
two spells that year; the average wage at each ﬁrm would form a separate
data point for that year. By contrast, theQP is an annual survey that records
data on each worker at only one point in the year (census date in March up
to 1993 and in October from 1994 onward). For the QP then, there is only
one worker spell per year.
The BeH draws data from the totality of gainfully employed members of
theGerman populationwho are covered by the social security system. Those
not covered are self-employed, family workers assisting in the operation of
a family business, civil servants (Beamte), and regular students. The BeH
covers roughly 80% of the German workforce. We focus solely on workers
employed in states of the former West Germany. Plausibility checks per-
formed by the social security institutions and the existence of legal sanctions
for misreporting guarantee that the earnings data are very reliable—in con-
trast with interview-based wage data, such as that in the Panel Study for In-
come Dynamics (PSID; for the United States) or the Socio-Economic Panel
(for Germany).
Unfortunately, the BeH documents only total spell earnings and not
hours worked in that spell. We therefore consider only full-time workers.
Nearly all full-time workers in Germany work a standard number of hours
per week, so the average daily wage should be very closely related to the
hourly wage. To calculate the daily real wage (in 2005 prices), we use Ger-
many’s consumer price index (CPI). Another problem is that wages are cen-
sored at a maximum level equal to the contribution assessment ceiling of the
compulsory pension insurance scheme.9 Earnings spells with wages above
or close to (within 1% of) the truncation point are dropped. We drop all8 In the presence of the mechanism identiﬁed in this paper, an additional likely
upward bias exists in the estimation of g (and hence an additional downward bias
in RTT). See n. 16 below.
9 In a sensitivity analysis in Snell et al. (2016), we found that our core result—the
downward bias when FYFE is not controlled for—was robust with respect to ar-
tiﬁcially censoring the highest wages in our already censored sample. This suggests
that the original censorship is not impacting our results.
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Aspells that have missing tenure. This means that a worker enters the data
only when he joins a ﬁrm after January 1, 1975.10 For this reason and to
match the data period used for Portugal, we drop the ﬁrst 12 years and
use worker spells dated 1986 and beyond.
TheQP covers all workers except the self-employed and those employed
in the public sector; of course, the unemployed and the inactive are also not
included.11 There are several wage variables, all of them expressed inmonthly
values (the most common type of pay in Portugal), including base wages,
tenure-related payments, overtime pay, subsidies, and other payments (this
latter category includes bonuses and proﬁt- or performance-related pay).
All QP wages have been deﬂated using Portugal’s CPI and are expressed
in 2005 euros. There is also information about normal hours and overtime
hours per month. The benchmark measure of pay adopted in this study is
based on the sum of all ﬁve types of pay divided by the sum of the two types
ofhoursworked, resulting in ameasure of total hourlypay.Tenure—in both
data sets—is measured (in rounded years) as the current year minus the re-
ported start year.
From the QP, we sample all workers from the 127 largest ﬁrms that ex-
isted throughout the entire period 1986–2009. From the BeH, we sample all
full-time, full-year worker spells from the 100 largest (West German) ﬁrms
that existed throughout the same time period.12 The motivation for using
large ﬁrms is to enable us to get good estimates of the vjt for subsequent
analysis. An additional reason to focus on a relatively small number of ﬁrms
is to allow a subsequent computation of diagnostic regressions (below) that
involve more than 2n regressors with two-dimensional ﬁxed effects. Of
course, estimated RTT of workers in large ﬁrms may not be representative
of RTT that exist in the economy at large. But in an earlier version of this
paper (Snell et al. 2016), we showed that our main result—that there is sub-
stantial downward RTT bias if you fail to control for equal-treatment wage
components—is robust with respect to changing the sample to (a) one con-
sisting of the 1,000 largest ﬁrms and (b) a randomly drawn sample of 10,000
(mostly small) ﬁrms.10 For this analysis we use only the years 1986–2009, but for the identiﬁcation of
ﬁrm entrants and the calculation of ﬁrm tenure we use BeH data from 1975 on-
ward. However, we exclude all spells starting January 1, 1975, because the tenure
could be left censored.
11 See Martins et al. (2012) for further details and a recent example of work using
the QP.
12 The BeH reports establishment-level data, and the QP reports ﬁrm-level data.
In the paper, we refer to both as ﬁrms. Focusing on full-year spells eliminates anom-
alies such as supposed full-time workers working for two ﬁrms at the same time and
workers who have short-tenured jobs. It also gives a cleaner approach to estimating
within-ﬁrm wage growth—especially when we use ﬁrst differences (Topel) in a re-
gression. Finally, having a maximum of one observation per worker per year makes
the German sample more comparable to the Portuguese sample.
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ADespite the small number of ﬁrms, the sample still yields around 3.3 mil-
lion data points for Portugal and 12.8 million data points for Germany,
around 5% and 3% of the total available data from the QP and the BeH,
respectively, over this period. We also observe a substantial proportion of
workers in more than one ﬁrm—just under 5% of workers in the Portu-
guese data and just under 10% in the German data. These are higher pro-
portions than one would expect if workers joined ﬁrms randomly. This
suggests that the labor markets within which these large ﬁrms operate have
a high degree of segmentation from the rest of the labor market.
Table 1 offers some summary statistics from the two samples. It shows
some stark differences in the two samples and in the two labor markets.
Aside from average wages being verymuch lower in our Portuguese sample
(as we would expect), wages are more than twice as variable therein. Aver-
age tenure, however, is substantial in both samples. Average separation rates
(which can be backed out from average tenure) are around 10% per year,
considerably lower than the around 30% level in the United States (see,
e.g., Hobijn and Şahin 2007). The sixth and last rows give the average ﬁrm
sizes in our core sample of 100 or 127 large ﬁrms and in the wider economy
(as recorded in the BeH and QP, respectively). Firms in general are smaller
in Portugal than in Germany. Our samples also indicate that variation in
size may be higher in Portugal than in Germany. The stark differences in
the labor markets is reassuring for our analysis; if we ﬁnd similar results
from both countries, then those results will have greater external validity
than those based on a single data set.
B. Implementation of the Methods and Estimates
We generalize the tenure function in equation (1) by allowing RTT to fol-
low a quartic function.13 Experience ismodeled via a quadratic function, and
we control for business cycles and common trends using yearﬁxed effects in
all methods.14 We control for time-invariant worker heterogeneity using
ﬁrst differences in Topel, match ﬁxed effects inMFE and FYFE, andworker
ﬁxed effects in the other speciﬁcations.15 We now give speciﬁc implementa-
tion details method by method.13 We also tried adding a tenure-zero dummy to the quartic to capture any addi-
tional wage effect of being a new hire that the quartic speciﬁcation cannot easily
capture; while we ﬁnd that there is a signiﬁcant pay increase in the ﬁrst year, in line
with previous work (e.g., Altonji and Shakotko 1987, table 1), the impact on RTT is
small in both data sets; likewise, the bias we ﬁnd is virtually unchanged.
14 In Snell et al. (2016) we found that the bias in MFE (RTT from FYFE minus
that fromMFE) was virtually unchanged when we generalized the experience func-
tion to a quartic.
15 As well as avoiding the use of subjectively selected controls that may otherwise
drive differences in our RTT estimates, our ﬁxed effects also imply that estimates of
g (linear experience) are driven by the same source of variation in each of the ﬁve
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ATopel. For the ﬁrst stage in Topel, we estimate the following regression
using data only on incumbents:
Dwijt 5 d 1 b2Dt2ijt 1 b3Dt3ijt 1 b4Dt4ijt 1 g2DE2ijt 1 uijt:
The estimate of d, d^ say, gives an estimate of b1 1 g1 1 m1, where b1 and g1
are the linear terms of the quartics in tenure and experience, respectively,
and m1 is the linear trend. We then regress the levels residual wijt 2 d^tijt 2bb2t2ijt 2 bb3t3ijt 2 bb4t4ijt 2 bg2E2ijt on E0ijt and (tijt 2 trt), where E0 is initial expe-
rience on joining the ﬁrm and tr is a time index. The coefﬁcients from this
second regression ( bg1 and bm1) are consistent estimates under our assump-
tions of g1 and m1, respectively. The estimate of b1 is then obtained as bb1 5
d^ 2 bg1 2 bm1.16
MFE and FYFE. For the ﬁrst stage in MFE, we estimate






ijt 1 g2E2ijt 1 vij 1 uijt (3)
using match ﬁxed effects to control for match quality vij. To estimate FYFE,
we add ﬁrm-year interaction ﬁxed effects to equation (3). Due to the addi-
tion of match ﬁxed effects, the estimated linear tenure coefﬁcientcb*1 inMFE
and FYFE is an estimate of b1 1 g1. Unlike Topel, where the linear tenure
coefﬁcient also includes the effect of trend, here the deterministic trend isTable 1
Sample Summary Statistics
Portugal Germany
Average log monthly wage (2005 euros) 7.01 7.91
Standard deviation of log monthly wage .637 .260
Standard deviation of log average annual ﬁrm employment .882 .760
Average tenure (years) 12.9 9.26
Standard deviation of tenure 10.2 7.28
Number of worker spells per ﬁrm per year 1,172 5,278
Number of years available (1986–2009)a 22 24
Number of tenure categories available 51 36
Average ﬁrm size in QP and BeH in 1997 9.5 14.6methods, namely, the wage variation of those workers w
sample.
16 Because d, by the reasoning of the paper, is downwar
consistent estimate of b1 requires an additional assumption
uncorrelated with duration as well as match quality (if they
then g1 will be upward biased and RTT will be downwa
equally to the second stage ofMFE below. But if experience
quality only via its correlation with duration, as assumed in
additional assumption.
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Aidentiﬁed separately and absorbed in the year and ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects,
respectively.17 To obtain a consistent estimate of g1, we regress the levels re-
sidualwijt 2
c
b*1 tijt 2 bb2t2ijt 2 bb3t3ijt 2 bb4t4ijt 2 bg2E2ijt on initial experience. This
coefﬁcient is subtracted fromcb*1 to give our estimate of b1.
AF. In AF, we simply add the within-match variate tcij—completed ten-
ure—to the main regression. For workers whose tenure is incomplete—
ongoing workers in 2009—we may use either imputed values or the actual
value of tenure in 2009. We experimented with two imputations: (i) we as-
sumed constant exit hazards after 2009, and (ii) we used the sample of work-
ers with completed tenures to compute the expected additional tenure of
workers with t years of tenure in 2009. Both imputation methods produced
proﬁles virtually identical to that obtained from using the value of ﬁnal ten-
ure itself, and so we simply present the proﬁle from the latter.
AS. For AS, we adjust the tenure terms by subtracting their respective
within-match means. For example, t3ijt becomes t3ijt 2 t
3
ijt where the overbar
denotes within-match mean. These variates are used as instruments for the
tenure terms in a two-stage least-squares (2SLS) IV regression.
C. Results
The estimates and standard errors of the quartic tenure parameters bi, i 5
1, ::: , 4 for the four traditional methods (T, AF, AS, and MFE) together
with the correctedmethod (FYFE) are presented in tableA1of the appendix,
available online. The coefﬁcient estimates are quite hard to map into RTT
itself—which is the object of interest here. More informative is the RTT ten-
ure proﬁles implied by these estimates. We plot these proﬁles for values of
tenure from 0 to 20 years in ﬁgure 1 (Portugal) and ﬁgure 2 (Germany).
The graphs show that AS, AF, and MFE offer similar RTT estimates.18
The methods themselves are in fact quite close. Both AS and MFE measure
the tenure regressors in the same way—that is, as deviations from match
mean. In fact, in the absence of other regressors, the 2SLS tenure estimates17 Topel argues that the estimate of deterministic trends from levels are upward
biased because of the secular tendency for worker quality to improve. For this rea-
son, he uses an extraneous trend estimate. However, this critique does not apply to
MFE and FYFE because in those speciﬁcations the match quality of every worker
is controlled for via match ﬁxed effects.
18 The 10-year tenure effects for the traditional estimators are broadly in line with
whatAltonji andWilliams (2005)ﬁnd for theUnited States in their reappraisal of ear-
lier work. That tenure proﬁles are falling at higher tenures is not unusual in the liter-
ature. For example, in Altonji andWilliams’s replication exercise, when, as here, the
time trend is controlled forusing timedummies andaquartic in tenure is included, the
IV1 estimates (AS here) have a falling tenure proﬁle above 5 or 10 years depending on
the speciﬁcation,whileTopel’smethodyields the sameat 10 and20years inoneof the
twospeciﬁcations reported (table3andn.12 inTopel1991).When theyadjust the rel-
ative timing of wage and tenure measures, they ﬁnd that the tenure effect is negative
above 10 years for both AS and T (table 5 in Topel 1991).
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Aof AS would be identical to those of MFE. As far as AF goes, if completed
tenure is a good proxy formatch quality, thenAFwill also effect an approx-
imate within-spell de-meaning of the regressors.
By contrast with the other threemethods, Topel’s method produces RTT
estimates that are quite low, and the dynamic pattern is also somewhat dif-
ferent. Of course, Topel uses a ﬁrst-differences speciﬁcation in contrast to
the levels of MFE, AF, and AS—an important difference that sets Topel
apart from theothermethods.At the same time,we should alsopoint out that
the standard errors of Topel’s estimates are quite high forGermany, suggest-
ing that the corresponding RTT schedule is not as precisely estimated as the
others. For Portugal, Topel’s estimates are better determined, but once again
the corresponding RTT lie substantially below that of the other three meth-
ods, and this is quite hard to rationalize.19FIG. 1.—Returns to ﬁrm tenure proﬁles from the ﬁve methods (Portugal). AF5
Abraham and Faber; AS 5 Altonji and Shakotko; FYFE 5 ﬁrm-year interaction
ﬁxed effects; MFE 5 match ﬁxed effects; T 5 Topel. A color version of this ﬁgure
is available online.19 Reversing the original ﬁndings in the literature, Altonji and Williams (2005)
argue that the reason for Topel’s (1991) ﬁnding of a much higher RTT than previ-
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AThe key point, however, is that in both data sets the corrected RTT pro-
ﬁle lies substantially above that of the other fourmethods.20 The purestmea-
sure of the impact of adding ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects on RTT can be seen by
looking at the vertical gap between FYFE andMFE, because the two meth-
ods differ only by the application of our proposed correction. This shows aFIG. 2.—Returns to ﬁrm tenure proﬁles from the ﬁve methods (Germany).
AF 5 Abraham and Faber; AS 5 Altonji and Shakotko; FYFE 5 ﬁrm-year inter-
action ﬁxed effects; MFE 5 match ﬁxed effects; T 5 Topel. A color version of this
ﬁgure is available online.ously estimated is to a substantial extent accounted for by his use of a secular wage
trend from an alternative data source (using a Current Population Survey–based
wage index rather than from the PSID he uses in his estimations, as was the case
in Abraham and Farber [1987], Altonji and Shakotko [1987], and this study) and
his use of lagged wages with current tenure. They also argue, in contrast to Topel,
that individual heterogeneity biases the return to experience downward in T (but
not AS) and so RTT upward, as discussed in n. 6.
20 Conﬁdence bands are not displayed to avoid cluttering the graph; however, a
95% conﬁdence interval around Portugal’s FYFE curve excludes all of the other
curves when tenure is below 18 years. The FYFE proﬁle for Germany is less well
deﬁned, and its conﬁdence interval is wider; nonetheless, it still excludes all of the
other curves when tenure exceeds 12 years.
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Asubstantial bias in the case of the Portuguese data, with FYFE lying 2.4% of
wages above MFE at 10 years of tenure—around 30% of the RTT level it-
self, although the gap falls somewhat as tenure grows toward 20 years. For
Germany, it is the other way around. MFE’s RTT lies only 1.3% of wages
below FYFE at 10 years of tenure, but the gap grows to around 2.5% of
wages as tenure increases to 20 years. If we repeat these calculations using
the average of the four traditional methods as a baseline, then the bias is
of course considerably larger.
We have shown that our corrected RTT proﬁle (FYFE) lies substantially
above that of the other fourmethods.We now try to expose and understand
better the source of these differences.
D. An Analysis of the Source of the Bias
We argued above that positive comovement of ﬁrm employment and ﬁrm
wages is a new (i.e., uninvestigated) source of bias in RTT estimates; when
a ﬁrm’s employment and wages rise (fall) together, its average tenure falls
(rises), and tenure becomes endogenous. To get a better analytical handle
on how this mechanism works, we use a simple model that offers a sketch of
themechanismatwork.Themodel hasonly a single regressor—tenure—with
a regression error consisting only of equal-treatment effects. Explicitly, we
consider the panel data regression of (log) wages on individual tenure
wijt 5 a 1 btijt 1 -jt, (4)
where symbols are as previously deﬁned.We ignore match ﬁxed effects and
the usual idiosyncratic regression error here becausewewish to focus on the
object of interest—bias caused by the existence of vjt and its comovement
withﬁrm employment at time t,Ljt say.We assume that the data comes from
allworkers inn largeﬁrms that exist overTyearswith total numberof obser-
vationsN5 (oTt51onj51Ljt). We discuss the interpretation ofvjt below, but for
now and for illustrative purposes we takevjt to be (proportional to) a mean-
zero shock to ﬁrm proﬁts.
Standard textbook theory tells us that ordinary least squares (OLS) bias
in the estimate of b will arise if tenure has a nonzero covariance with the
















where t is the samplemean tenure.21We can rewrite the term in braces to get21 In this illustration, we abuse notation by indexing each ﬁrm’s workers in the
same way; i.e., worker i 5 1, ::: ,Ljt, when in fact the identity of workers at time t in
ﬁrm j will vary from year to year.
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where tjt is the average tenure of ﬁrm j and t is the long-run average tenure
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: (8)
Now suppose in year t that there is positive comovement between the
hiring done by ﬁrm j and its proﬁt shock vjt. Effectively, this means that
ﬁrms currently experiencing above-average proﬁts (i.e., -jt > 0) will have
above-average employment, above-average hiring, and below-average ten-
ure. Hence, (tjt 2 tt) will be negative and vjtLjt positive for such ﬁrms (vice
versa for ﬁrms experiencing a negative proﬁts shock). The net effect is to
make scov—the OLS bias—negative.
Note that the above logic would apply to a random sample (rather than a
complete sample) of workers from these ﬁrms: a randomly chosen worker
who has a higher than average wage is more likely to have come from a ﬁrm
that has high levels of current employment (and high levels of hiring) than
from one with low levels, and that ﬁrm is more likely to have average tenure
below the average for the economy as a whole. The bias argument goes
through unchanged. One aspect that does change when we have only a ran-
dom sample of workers is our ability to reliably estimate and control for
equal-treatment effects vjt. In fact, in random worker samples we are likely
to see very few workers working at the same ﬁrm, making identiﬁcation of
and controlling for vjt practically impossible. This is one reason we chose a
sample of ﬁrms rather than a sample of workers.
The preceding arguments were an analytical sketch of the main mecha-
nism. In section A2 of the appendix, we develop a more formal model of
the bias. Our benchmark model is equation (1) with equation (2). The key
additional assumptions are that there are complete data on all workers in a
small number of long-lived large ﬁrms (offering a large number of data
points in each year in each ﬁrm), that there is an exogenous worker exit/quit
rate that we allow to be different in each ﬁrm, and that a worker’s initial ex-
perience on entering the ﬁrm is exogenous. The model also admits a com-
pletely general set of ﬁxed effects. We ﬁnd that the RTT bias is a weighted
average (acrossﬁrms) of the comovements between aﬁrm’swage and its cur-
rent and lagged employment levels. A key special case occurs when comove-
ments between current wages and current employment are positive whileThis content downloaded from 129.215.019.114 on January 11, 2018 02:22:18 AM
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Athose between current wages and lagged employment are 0. In this case, the
biases from each of the four methods are negative.When we generalize to al-
low current wage to comove with lagged employment as well, this turns out
to be relatively unimportant in determining the bias. It is the contemporane-
ous wage/employment comovement that matters most.
E. The Economic Mechanism Behind the Bias
Our primary claim is that the existence of equal-treatment wage compo-
nents that drive employment is an important source of RTT bias. We argue
in Section II.F that it is movements in these components below the macro
level that matter. We now try and justify that claim. First, we discuss some
models that are consistent with our approach. Then, we look at the nature of
the shocks we have identiﬁed and argue that they are consistent with our
contention.
Consider a standard search-matching framework adapted to large ﬁrms
(Elsby andMichaels 2013), with continuous bargaining.22 Positive comove-
ment of wages with employment requires, for example, that the higher wages
after a positive ﬁrm shock be associated with more matches being made or
fewer separations; for Elsby andMichaels (2013), a positive or negative shock
to aﬁrm’s productivity of sufﬁcient sizewill lead to theﬁrm increasing or de-
creasing its vacancies and hence hiring or laying off workers. A similar story
could be told in a rent-sharing or union model where positive shocks to a
ﬁrm’s price or productivity lead to higher employment, proﬁts, and wages
of all workers.
A number of wage-posting models with on-the-job search exhibit posi-
tive tenure effects even in the absence of speciﬁc capital accumulation. For
example, Burdett and Coles (2003) show that with risk-averse workers,
wage-tenure contracts can arise, in which wages increase with tenure. The
function of this back-loading is to prevent turnover—ﬁrms cannot respond
to outside offers, but higher pay for higher-tenured workers makes better
outside offers less likely.23 In equilibrium, different ﬁrms start newworkers
at different points on the same tenure ladder. This leads to wage shopping22 To be consistent with the basic model outlined in eqq. (1) and (2), we could in-
corporate accumulation of general and job-speciﬁc capital and random match qual-
ity, with all three translating multiplicatively into efﬁciency units of labor and hence
wages. The latter would, however, depend on the bargaining protocol: that a worker
loses speciﬁc capital and idiosyncratic job-match quality on leaving the ﬁrm would
affect the outside option, such that the bargained wage may not be identical for each
efﬁciency unit. (Elsby and Michaels [2013] use the Stole-Zwiebel bargaining solu-
tion.) If shocks to ﬁrm productivity also affect individual productivity multiplica-
tively, they will affect log wages of all workers, including new hires, approximately
equally.
23 Note that retention operates in the same direction: in these models, a decrease
in ﬁrmwages following a negative shock, e.g., will lead to workers with shorter ten-
ure disproportionately quitting (as they are more sensitive to outside offers), thus
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Aand hence experience effects. Bagger et al. (2014) look at a related model in
which ﬁrms can, however, match outside offers. Wages rise with tenure but
stochastically, because the ﬁrm responds to outside offers (there is no point
in back-loading). These models for tractability typically do not have ﬁrm-
speciﬁc shocks of the type we have in mind (ﬁrms are identical in Burdett
and Coles [2003] but have different but ﬁxed productivity in Bagger et al.
[2014]). Nevertheless, in this general class of models it would be expected
that a positive ﬁrm productivity shock would increase the incentive for
the ﬁrm to hire (by raising the wage proﬁle and hence the utility of a con-
tract offered to new hires) and to want to increase incumbent pay (to reduce
turnover); thus, one would see highly correlated wage shocks across work-
ers in the ﬁrm associated with an increase in employment (and vice versa for
negative shocks).24
Models in which equal treatment (in the form of equal pay per efﬁciency
unit) is imposed or derived more straightforwardly lead to the empirical re-
lationship hypothesized here (see, e.g., Gertler and Trigari 2009; Snell and
Thomas 2010) when combined with a monopsonistic setting so that higher
wages are needed to increase employment (or a competitive setting but with
segmented labor markets so that positive industry shocks to productivity
lead to higher industry wages and employment). In a model of on- and off-
the-job search with equal treatment (so a ﬁrm cannot respond to outside of-
fers as it pays all workers the same within a period), Moscarini and Postel-
Vinay (2013) analyze the effect of aggregate shocks onwage contracts.When
positive shocks occur, for example, larger ﬁrms expand more rapidly than
smaller ones and contract more rapidly in downswings (however, they can-
not consider idiosyncratic shocks, as the equilibrium of the model can be
characterized only when ﬁrm size ranking is preserved).
If mechanisms of the type described above are generating positive wage/
employment comovements sufﬁcient to underlie the bias, we would expect
to ﬁnd evidence that thewagemodel we estimate generates a sufﬁcient change
in the present value of wages to attract new and retain older workers when
positive shocks occur and vice versa with negative shocks.25 It is highly un-
likely that transient shocks to wages will have any effect at all on attracting
labor. By contrast, permanent or highly persistent movements in a ﬁrm’s
wage will very likely affect its hiring, worker entry, and worker exit.
Because our sample contains large numbers of workers per ﬁrm per year,
we can estimate each ﬁrm-year equal-treatment component and examine itslengthening tenure. Likewise, if the ﬁrm is laying off workers in response to a neg-
ative shock in a last-in, ﬁrst-out model, tenure will lengthen.
24 A model related to that of Bagger et al. (2014) that also has investment in spe-
ciﬁc and general training is Lentz and Roys (2015).
25 This is particularly true of the wage-posting models, which rely on wages to
attract new workers and retain existing workers.
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Apersistence and transience. Treating the estimated ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects
from the FYFE speciﬁcation as data, we computed the ﬁrst-order autocor-
relation coefﬁcients (r, say) in a balanced panel regression. The r-values for
Portugal and Germany were 0.92 and 0.99, respectively—suggesting unit
root or near–unit root behavior.26 Additionally, we found that the residual
from the FYFE, after eliminating the equal-treatment shocks and match ef-
fects, was close to white noise (r-values of20.015 and 0.115, respectively).27
It seems, then, that—in our data at least—the two sources of permanent
movements in a worker’s wage within the ﬁrm appear to be the match effect
(permanent by deﬁnition) and the equal-treatment shocks. If idiosyncratic
shocks to wages were permanent, then they too may well drive labor re-
allocations and hence be correlated with tenure. In that case, any attempts
to estimate RTT via a reduced-form (Mincer)methodwould be confounded
at the outset because—almost by deﬁnition—we cannot control for these
shocks in standard regression analysis.Ourﬁnding that idiosyncratic shocks
appear to be white noise is important, therefore; it is consistent with the
idea that it is equal-treatment shocks that drive the unit root behavior in
wages instead.28
It would be interesting to seewhether the equal-treatment shockswe have
estimated correlate with ﬁrm productivity and/or its product price—a topic
for future research. If this turned out to be true, our results would be con-
sistent with the hypothesis that these shocks drive hiring and that ﬁrms
share rents with their workers; following a positive (permanent) shock to
its product price or its productivity, a proﬁt-maximizing ﬁrm would hire
more workers and, under equal treatment or bargaining, the newly hired
and the incumbents would get a share of the improved proﬁts. In the next
section, we examinewhat our data have to say about the role ofﬁrm-speciﬁc26 Unit root behavior of a worker’s wage within a ﬁrm is a stylized fact in labor
markets. See, e.g., Buhai et al. (2014).
27 Under the null hypothesis that the idiosyncratic wage components follow a
unit root and that workers quit the ﬁrm when the value of this process falls below
some value c*, we can show that the empirical autocorrelation coefﬁcient still tends
to unity, so our results strongly suggest that this can be rejected. However, if the
components are stationary (and again workers quit at some low threshold value),
simulations suggest that the autocorrelation coefﬁcient will underestimate the true
degree of persistence.
28 Topel (1991, 160–2) discusses the issue in some detail and ﬁnds no evidence
that individual wage growth differences are related to contemporaneous mobility.
Theoretically, if the process driving a unit root in the wage reﬂects general human
capital, then this should not affect mobility, as outside options will move in tandem
with inside returns. Likewise, timing is important: if it takes time to locate a new job
after a negative wage shock, so that mobility is affected only after the period of the
shock, there is no bias. Our point is that even if persistent wage shocks do affect
contemporaneous mobility, so long as the persistence arises only through the equal
treatment component and this is controlled for as we are proposing, there will be no
bias.
This content downloaded from 129.215.019.114 on January 11, 2018 02:22:18 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
Bias in Returns to Tenure 65
Awage/employment comovements in generating the differences we see in ﬁg-
ures 1 and 2.
F. The Role of Firm-Speciﬁc Wage/Employment Comovements
If the assumptions and arguments we make in this paper are correct, then
the FYFEmethod identiﬁes the causal effect of tenure onwages. If initial ex-
perience is positively correlated with match quality, then the FYFEmethod
at the very least offers a lower bound on the causal effect of tenure onwages.
In this section and henceforth, we refer to differences between an estimated
RTT proﬁle from the FYFE method and another method as “bias.”Use of
this term is for convenience, and it comes with the obvious caveat that it is
correct terminology only if the assumptions and arguments we have made
in the paper are true.
The contention of the paper is that comovement between ﬁrm wages and
employment leads to a bias in the estimation of b in equation (1) using tra-
ditional methods, andwe have found this bias to be negative and signiﬁcant,
implying that the comovement is positive. In principle, the positive co-
movement between ﬁrmwages and employment originating from the busi-
ness cycle could be one source of bias in line with this logic. However, in
our estimates we had controlled for the business cycle via the addition of gen-
eral year effects. In Snell et al. (2016), we found very little effect on the bias
of not controlling for the business cycle in this way. The implication is that
it is ﬁrm-, locality-, or industry-speciﬁc and not systemic ﬁrm wage/em-
ployment comovements that are the primary cause of the problem.
Nevertheless, to control for ﬁrm-speciﬁc wage/employment comove-
ments the inclusion of current ﬁrm employment in the Mincer equation is
a possible alternative approach to addingFYFE.29However, it is easy to show
that this will remove the bias only if the elasticities of the wage/employment
relationships are identical across ﬁrms. If there is a large amount of hetero-
geneity in these elasticities across ﬁrms, then this will not work.
Natural vehicles to investigate these issues empirically are the MFE and
FYFE speciﬁcations; they are nested and differ only because of the addition
of ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects. We conducted two exercises using these speciﬁ-
cations. In the ﬁrst, we add (log of) ﬁrm employment and lagged ﬁrm em-
ployment to the MFE speciﬁcation, allowing separate coefﬁcients for each
ﬁrm.30 The addition of these terms allows us to identify each ﬁrm’s wage/
employment and wage/lagged-employment elasticities and hence to see29 Buhai et al. (2014) call the impact of ﬁrm employment on wages the ﬁrm size
effect (although the traditional view of the ﬁrm size effect is a steady-state notion).
These traditional size effects would typically be absorbed using either ﬁrm ﬁxed ef-
fects or match ﬁxed effects.
30 As before, we allow for a quartic in tenure and a quadratic in experience and
add year ﬁxed effects.
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Awhether these elasticities are heterogeneous.31 Note that the addition of
lagged employment terms is purely to obtain better estimates of the contem-
poraneous comovements; equation (A1) in the appendix shows that in the
current context, lagged employment is of second-order importance to the
bias, as discussed in Section II.D. In the second exercise, we add (log of) ﬁrm
employment and laggedﬁrm employmentwith a single (i.e., common across
ﬁrms) coefﬁcient. The idea here is that if the elasticities we found in the ﬁrst
exercise are homogeneous across ﬁrms, then we would expect the addition
of these two terms to eliminate much of the RTT bias we found in ﬁgures 1
and 2. By contrast, if there is substantial heterogeneity in the elasticities,
then the bias will remain. In this case, we might expect the ﬁrst exercise to
eliminate much of the RTT bias. For clarity, we call the speciﬁcation in ex-
ercise 1 the heterogeneous speciﬁcation and that in exercise 2 the homoge-
neous speciﬁcation.Histogramsof the contemporaneouswage/employment
elasticities obtained from the heterogeneous speciﬁcation are plotted in ﬁg-
ure 3A and 3B for Portugal and Germany, respectively.32
The ﬁgures show two things: ﬁrst, that the elasticities are far more dis-
persed across ﬁrms in Portugal compared with Germany (the variance in
Portugal is three times larger than that inGermany), and second, that the av-
erage elasticity—the key determinant of the bias in our analytical model—is
much higher in the former than in the latter (0.06 in Portugal vs. 0.01 inGer-
many).33Given the arguments above,wewould expect the bias to be larger in
Portugal than in Germany—as indeed can be seen in ﬁgures 1 and 2. More
pertinently for the current discussion,wewould expect theRTTproﬁles ob-
tained from the homogeneous speciﬁcation to be close to FYFE for Ger-
many but not for Portugal. For Portugal, wewould expect only the heteroge-
neous speciﬁcation to deliver RTT estimates close to those of FYFE instead.
To examine these statements, we compute the differences between the
following RTT proﬁles for both countries:34 (a) FYFE and the homogenous31 In the analytical model considered in the appendix, the covariances driving the
biases approximate (for small changes in wages and employment) these elasticities.
32 The elasticities with respect to lagged employment were negative on average
for Portugal but positive for Germany; histograms are shown in the appendix. The
variance was again three times higher in Portugal than in Germany. As noted in the
text, the bias formula given in the annex predicts that in neither case do these lagged
comovements matter very much in determining the bias.
33 In the general version of the model, where ﬁrms may have different sizes and
rates of exit, it is a weighted average of elasticities that matter. Only when ﬁrms are
the same does the bias depend on the simple average of the elasticities. As we have
only large ﬁrms in our sample, we might expect them to be close in terms of size and
possibly also in terms of quit rates.
34 More precisely, we compute the differences between estimates of RTT 1 g
from the ﬁrst-stage regressions. Under our assumptions that g is consistently esti-
mated, these differences are the same as differences in RTT.
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Aspeciﬁcation(Hom)and(b)FYFEandtheheterogeneousspeciﬁcation (Het).
These differences are plotted for Portugal and Germany in ﬁgure 4A and
4B, respectively. For comparison purposes, we also add a line representing
the bias in MFE (the gap between FYFE andMFE in ﬁgs. 1 and 2). In these
graphs, the height above the X-axis represents the bias in each respectiveFIG. 3.—Contemporaneous ﬁrm wage/employment elasticities for Portugal (A)
and Germany (B). A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.This content downloaded from 129.215.019.114 on January 11, 2018 02:22:18 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
AFIG. 4.—Returns to ﬁrm tenure bias when ﬁrm employment is controlled for,
for Portugal (A) and Germany (B). FYFE 5 ﬁrm-year interaction ﬁxed effects;
Het 5 heterogeneous speciﬁcation; Hom 5 homogeneous speciﬁcation; MFE 5
match ﬁxed effects. A color version of this ﬁgure is available online.This content downloaded from 129.215.019.114 on January 11, 2018 02:22:18 AM
ll use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Aspeciﬁcation—that is, the extent to which each respective speciﬁcation fails
to match the RTT generated by the FYFE speciﬁcation. The line showing
FYFE minus MFE is the baseline bias, the line showing FYFE minus Het
is the bias from the heterogeneousmodel, and the line showing FYFEminus
Hom is the bias from the homogenous model.
We see that for Germany the homogeneous speciﬁcation eliminates all of
the baseline bias (its proﬁle lies slightly below the X-axis, which we could
interpret as removing the bias). The heterogeneous speciﬁcation overcor-
rects for the bias and also lies below the X-axis. However, using a bounds
test derived in Snell et al. (2016), it is not signiﬁcantly negative at any tenure
value. For Portugal, things are very different. The homogeneous speciﬁca-
tion has virtually no impact on the bias—the line showing FYFE minus
Hom lies practically on top of the baseline. By contrast, allowing heteroge-
neous comovements has far more leverage than it does in Germany—most
of the bias is removed by controlling for heterogeneous (across ﬁrm) wage/
employment comovements. These results are consistent with what we pre-
dicted in the earlier discussion; the extent to which the bias may be removed
by adding single-coefﬁcient employment terms depends on how homoge-
nous cross-ﬁrm wage/employment comovements are—where they are het-
erogeneous, adding employment terms with common cross-ﬁrm coefﬁcients
has no impact on the bias.
G. Equal Treatment or Unequal Treatment?
Up to now we have focused on ﬁrm wage/employment comovements
driven by wage shocks that are common to all workers. It is possible, how-
ever, that wage components of new hires alone may be causing bias and that
these components are not present in incumbent wages. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that the ﬁrm was hiring under conditions of monopsony. Suppose also
that when proﬁtability is high, hiring is high and new hires are brought in at
a wage above that of incumbents. This would drive up the ﬁrm’s average
wage in that year and drive down the ﬁrm’s average tenure. Once again we
would get downward bias in RTT. But this effect is not an equal-treatment
effect—it is driven entirely by comovements between the new-hire wage and
employment. This new-hire-only effect works via the same mechanism as
our equal-treatment story, but if it were to be the only mechanism behind
the bias, it suggests that a more efﬁcient empirical procedure to remove it
would focus on new-hire wages only.3535 If new hires receive a premium or discount in wages that is permanent—as
would be consistent with models of full commitment by worker and ﬁrm—these
will be absorbed in match ﬁxed effects and will not affect estimates of RTT. It is
short-lived changes to the wages of a new hire, related to a ﬁrm’s employment de-
cisions, that we have in mind—e.g., a premium in the ﬁrst year of employment and
thereafter being paid at some standard rate. Contracting models with limited com-
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AIn light of the previous discussion, it would be interesting to see whether
augmenting FYFE with ﬁrm-year controls for newly hired workers only
raises the RTT proﬁle further. We call this augmented speciﬁcation NHFY
for convenience. Unfortunately, NHFY will as a by-product also remove
from the RTT proﬁle the effects of wage growth during the ﬁrst year of ten-
ure. If the RTT gradient is steeper in the ﬁrst year of tenure than in later
years, removing it will move the overall RTT proﬁle upward. To allow for
this and to be able to compare like with like, we also strip out the initial ten-
ure effect from the initial FYFE speciﬁcation by adding a new-hire dummy
to it. Estimating FYFEwith its new-hire dummy andNHFYproducedRTT
proﬁles that were within 0.2% of each other (with NHFY being slightly
higher in both countries). The key takeaway of this exercise is that equal-
treatment wage components are the main driver behind RTT bias; adjusting
additionally for movements in new-hire wages has little incremental effect
on the RTT proﬁle.
III. RTT and Implicit Wage Contracts
The purpose of this paper has been to derive unbiased estimates of the
causal effects of tenure on wages—that is, the effect on wages of experimen-
tally increasing tenure by 1 year while keeping everything else in the econ-
omy (including, e.g., outside options) constant. To achieve unbiasedness, we
have shown that it is necessary to control for equal-treatmentwage shocks as
well as the more traditional unobservedmatch effects. Wages may vary with
tenure for a number of reasons, not least because of returns to experience
that are general market returns, but they also respond to internal offers. As
discussed above, RTT estimates may be capturing the latter—a reward to
the accumulation of speciﬁc capital, either human or physical. These returns
might accrue to the worker for a variety of reasons: bargaining over quasi
rents, for example, or aﬁrm being prepared to respond to outside offers (dis-
tributed independently of the value of speciﬁc capital) to keep a workerwith
speciﬁc capital in the ﬁrm (see, e.g., Lentz and Roys 2015).
However, the existence of quasi rents (due to speciﬁc capital accumula-
tion or search frictions) or the ability of ﬁrms to commit may allow con-
tracts in which wages do not correspond to marginal products in a time-
invariant fashion; a classic example would be back-loaded wages to reduce
turnover (as in Holmstrom 1983). If there is no observable variable with
which to control for contract-driven wage growth (as would be implied
by back-loading, say) then our estimates of RTT will include such effects.
If this were true, only the results from a calibrated theoretical model couldmitment, e.g., often have this short-run property (e.g., Beaudry and DiNardo 1991;
Rudanko 2009).
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Aseparately identify contract and human capital effects from estimated RTT.
In this scenario, our bias correction would yield consistent estimates of an
RTT 1 wage contract effect. Even in this scenario, these estimates would
be useful raw inputs to a calibration exercise of a theoretical model that at-
tempts to separately identify the respective effects. If there is an observable
control forwage contract effects, it should be used to be able to identify pure
ﬁrm-speciﬁc human capital RTT.One class of contract models that does of-
fer observable controls for wage contracts arises fromBeaudry andDiNardo’s
(1991) paper on implicit contracts.
Beaudry and DiNardo (1991) developed a model where—modulo ﬁrm-
speciﬁc human capital—the minimum unemployment rate since the worker
joined the ﬁrm (minu, for short) was a sufﬁcient statistic for within-ﬁrm
wage movements.36 This spawned an empirical literature that added minu
toMincer equations to assess its importance. The ﬁndings in our paper have
ramiﬁcations for this literature. Minu is intrinsically correlated with ten-
ure—it falls in a weakly monotone fashion with it. Failing to control for
positive ﬁrm wage/employment comovements biases the minu coefﬁcient
for much the same reasons as it biases RTT: higher ﬁrm wages associated
with higher ﬁrm employment will lead to lower average ﬁrm tenure. Given
that minu is negatively correlated with tenure, it would be tempting to state
that this bias is positive (toward 0 for a negative coefﬁcient). But in Snell
et al. (2016) we argued that the inclusion of tenure in the regression com-
plicates the bias, and in general it cannot be signed. Nevertheless, using the
Portuguese data we showed that adding ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects to a speciﬁ-
cation such as MFE that also includes minu dramatically affects our infer-
ences; the coefﬁcient on minu falls (in absolute value) from a highly signif-
icant value of20.93 to a borderline signiﬁcant value of20.29.Whatever the
sign of the bias in this context, equal-treatment wage components should be
controlled for; at best they are unwanted noise, and at worst they cause bias.
Finally, there is a recent empirical literature that tries to establish the ex-
tent to which the contract hiring wage is sensitive to conditions at the time
of hiring. In this literature, focus is on the signiﬁcance of a measure of the
state of the labor market (typically aggregate unemployment) and a new-
hire dummy. If this variable—deltau, for short—is found to have a signiﬁ-
cantly negative impact onwages, it implies thatﬁrms take advantage of poor36 In their analysis, wages will be weakly increasing with tenure since wages are
increasing with the tightest labor market conditions within the current job. Hage-
dorn andManovskii (2013) argue that the results are consistent with a match quality
interpretation, as opposed to an implicit contract interpretation: better matches,
which pay more, are more likely to survive periods of heightened job offers, prox-
ied by cumulative low unemployment rates, and they offer evidence to support this
view. Bellou and Kaymak (2016), on the other hand, ﬁnd evidence for a history de-
pendence in wages for stayers, which suggests that contracts do play a role.
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Alabor market conditions when hiring. As with minu, deltau is negatively
correlated with tenure, and once again failure to control for ﬁrm-year ﬁxed
effects would cause its estimated effect to be biased. To sum up this discus-
sion, controlling for the effects of wage contracts is crucial to be able to iden-
tify human capital RTT, but controlling for equal-treatment components of
wages is essential to get good estimates of both.
IV. Conclusion
We have shown in this paper that the positive comovement of equal-
treatment wage components and ﬁrm employment causes signiﬁcant bias
in RTT. We showed that our equal-treatment shocks are highly persistent
(unit root or near–unit root processes) and that controlling for them signif-
icantly changes the RTT estimates. This is important, as we would expect
onlypersistentwage shocks todriveﬁrmquits andﬁrmhiring.Weconcluded
that match quality and our equal-treatment shocks are two of a kind—per-
sistent shocks to wages that impact a worker’s tenure. Finally, we found that
controlling for these two shocks reduces the residual error to (near) white
noise. This is consistent with the argument that adding ﬁrm-year ﬁxed ef-
fects and match ﬁxed effects to Mincer equations is necessary to control for
those wage components that are jointly endogenous with tenure. This gives
us some conﬁdence that our bias-corrected reduced-form estimates of RTT
are causal. We conclude with some additional ad hoc observations arising
from our work.
First, if one is purely interested in effects that vary only with year and
tenure, then equal-treatment shocks are noise and removing them seems a
sensible thing to do. Once match quality is controlled for, only the cross-
tenure/year movements in wages are relevant to estimating RTT; compo-
nents of wages that are common to workers in ﬁrm j in year t cannot add
information to this.
Second, our FYFE correction allows for the possibility that ﬁrms may
have heterogeneous wage and employment cotrends. Fast-growing and
high-wage-growthﬁrmswouldhave loweraverage tenureandhigheraverage
wages, while slow-growing and low-wage-growth ﬁrms would have higher
average tenure and lower averagewages.This typeof issuehasbeendiscussed
before in the RTT literature, but as far as we know it has not been analyzed.
Third, in this paper we focused on MFE as a baseline speciﬁcation or
method. But in fact we could add ﬁrm-year ﬁxed effects to any of the three
other methods to control for the bias we have identiﬁed.
Finally, the need to control for FYFE would seem to rule out the use of
small random samples of workers to obtain unbiased RTT estimates. Such
samples are unlikely to contain two workers in the same ﬁrm. Just how
manyworkers per ﬁrm are required to remove the bias effectively is unclear
and a subject for future research.This content downloaded from 129.215.019.114 on January 11, 2018 02:22:18 AM
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